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The topic of this research is Bio-Terrorism and the preparedness of 
municipalities.  The purpose of this and ensuing research is to demonstrate that 
municipalities are not effectively or adequately prepared to respond to a Bio-Terrorism 
attack, due to manning (personnel), adequate training, and a lack of proper protective 
and detection equipment.  The research consisted of surveys and interviews of 48 
officers from 43 small (1-50 personnel), medium (50-500 personnel) to large (500 + 
personnel) agencies.  The individuals surveyed included command staff ranging from 
patrol officers and sergeants, to chiefs of police.  The findings from the surveys and 
interviews in this particular research are demographically and regionally specific to the 
state of Texas.  The data affirms that municipalities fall short in areas of being fully 
prepared to respond to a chemical or biological attack.  It is concluded that even with 
the shortfalls that municipalities face, there are ways to improve the preparedness level 
through intergovernmental relationships, better communications within city agencies 
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  Germ warfare has long since been a national security threat, and even more so 
since the Gulf War, 9/11, and the Iraq conflict.  The Chemical and Biological threats are 
no longer just a threat to our soldiers on the battlefield in foreign countries; they have 
become a threat to our neighborhood streets and even our backyards, because of the 
criminal and terrorist interests.  With the deadliest chemical and biological agents for 
sale to whichever criminal or terrorist group who wants to pay, or even develop them, 
the time is NOW, for all cities including small municipalities, to be prepared. 
 The most serious issues that face all public safety responders in cities and 
communities today, is that most would not be able to respond adequately to a biological 
or chemical attack.  Due to a lack of planning, training personnel, funding, and proper 
equipment, responding to such an incident could result in injuries or death to the police 
officers, firefighters and EMS personnel responding to the incident.  Even with 
Hazardous Materials Response Units (HAZMAT) responding to chemical and biological 
attacks, there is a high potential for mass casualties, due to the lack of sophisticated 
survelliance and testing equipment.  With the many chemical and biological agents 
capable of being used and the multitude of delivery systems that range from explosive 
devices and aerosol cans, to water and even our pets, the “what if” becomes the “how 
and what now”.    
The purpose of this and ensuing research is to address the problem, that   
municipalities are not properly prepared, with a plan of action to respond effectively to a 
biological or chemical attack such as Bio-Terrorism.  Several underlying problems that 
must be solved first are, risk assessments to determine if municipalities are threatened 
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by bio-terrorism; Assuring agencies within municipalities have a working and practiced 
“Plan of Action” in place,  Co-ordinate and facilitate help from assisting federal and local 
agencies for response in relatively short amount of time.  It is also a necessity that 
individual agencies within these municipalities have the proper equipment to respond to 
such an attack. 
The methods of inquiry for this research will be a review of literature from 
government and military journals and articles, books on bio-terrorism/terrorism 
response, along with surveys of police agencies, as well as past surveys and interviews 
used as data in previous research.  It is anticipated that irregardless of the type of 
biological or chemical attack or incident, police, fire and emergency medical personnel, 
will always be the first responders.  With this information given, it the responsibility of 
these first responders to prevent the death and injury to not only themselves, but further 
procure the safety of the general public.  In any such event having a working, practiced 
plan of action in place, is paramount.  This plan of action should be elastic and 
adaptable with the measures or steps outlined for, Police, Fire and EMS personnel and 
the roles they assume upon arrival at the incident location.  The plan should include 
state and federal agencies and the roles they will take and perform.  The ability for all 
parties involved, being adaptable in the performance of separate tasks and roles should 
be greatly considered.  Depending on the type of chemical or biological incident and 
location, there could be a lengthy time constraint on the arrival of help from outside 
(State and Federal) agencies and personnel. 
The findings are anticipated to show that even with a larger amount of police 
personnel being trained most all police agencies, still lack a working, practiced plan of 
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action for responding to a chemical and biological attack or incident.  The findings will 
further show that even with money given out by the millions for equipment and training 
from the federal government, the constant need for funding and training to continue is 
imperative for public safety preparedness.  Without this continual and unified training 
and proper equipment, a response would be ineffective and could result in mass 
casualties, as well as, legal responsibility.  The findings can add support to intra-agency 
co-operation being necessary in the fight against Bio-Terrorism.   
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
During the research on the topic of municipalities being prepared to respond to a 
bioterrorism attack, what the author focused on was the training of the responding 
agencies.  During the review of the researched literature, the author observed that the 
preparedness level of the country is not where it should be, in terms of the big picture. 
Although there has been millions of dollars set out by government agencies, to include 
the Department of Homeland Security, there is still a huge shortage when it comes to 
preparedness. According to the Council of Foreign Relations (2003, February), 
“emergency responders lack the necessary funding and preparation needed to 
adequately respond to a terrorist attack”.  The overall process is not limited to just the 
training of first responders, it needs to involve everyone from city street workers to the 
city mayors.  A strong communication between all entities will develop a solid network 
that would allow for prevention and preparedness.   
METHODOLOGY 
 
The daily threats of law enforcement are a constant, even with the progressive 
training and ever evolving high tech equipment and gear that are used to work with.  
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With all that is required of us to afford the communities that we secure the best service, 
it should be mandated by our citizens that we be prepared for an event with the 
unforgiving magnitude of a biological or chemical attack.  It is hypothesized that even 
after billions of dollars spent and given out to thousands of agencies and five years to 
prepare, by effectively planning, equipping, and training that most municipalities are still 
not ready to adequately respond to devastating an event of Bio-Terrorism.  Although 
most all agencies surveyed stated that they did, have a plan of action and trained 
personnel, the research will support that several factors still prevent these municipalities 
from having a “working plan”, a plan that has been tested and practiced.  The methods 
used were two separate surveys and interviews conducted 3 years apart. 
The research will consist of surveys and interviews of forty-eight (48) officers 
from forty-three (43) small (1-50 personnel), medium (50-500 personnel) to large (500 + 
personnel) agencies.  The individuals to be surveyed will include command staff ranging 
from patrol officers, and sergeants to chiefs of police.  These agencies serve 
populations from two hundred (200) to two million (2,000,000) people and cover every 
region of the State of Texas (North, South, East, West, Central, Gulf Coast).  The 
survey questionnaires will be answered on a voluntary basis.  The raw data will be 
received from six questions on a survey provided to a member of the responding 
agencies in 2003 and again to a separate set of responding agencies 2006.  The 
surveyed information that will be gathered for use will be compiled and compared in an 
effort to affirm the author’s hypothesis.  Additional research will include surveys and 
interviews performed in previous academic research, a review of reports and the 
findings from the General Accounting Office and Office of the Inspector General, as well 
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as, reports to Congress and a review of other noted governmental literature, articles, 
and journals.   
FINDINGS 
 
The findings from the surveys and mini interviews in this particular research are 
demographically and regionally specific to the state of Texas.  It is not inclusive of all 
state, county and municipal agencies in the state, but the survey sample does 
incorporate agencies from all regional areas of the State (North Texas, South Texas, 
West Texas, East Texas, Central Texas, and the Texas Gulf Coast).  The survey 
sample in its essence is random and performed on a voluntary basis. It includes 43 
small (1-50 personnel), medium (50-500 personnel) to large (500 + personnel) 
agencies.  The 48 individuals surveyed included command staff with a range from patrol 
officer to sergeants, and sergeants to chiefs of police.  These agencies serve 
populations with a vast range from two hundred (200) to two million (2,000,000).  This 
survey does not account for loses or gains of personnel to agencies, so a margin of 
error was not specifically calculated, but may slightly exist.  This data shows that most 
all municipalities fall short in all the areas of being fully prepared to respond to a 
chemical or biological attack.  A positive finding that does impact overall preparedness if 
such an event occurred is the data showing that individual officers have become more 
prepared.  This fact alone illustrates that eventually officers can succeed in becoming 
fully prepared.  
The results of the two surveys from 2003 and 2006 indicated the combined 
results that out of 43 agencies, sixteen percent (16%) had trained all of their officers, 
forty-six percent (46%) had several officers trained, twenty-one percent (21%) had no 
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training for their agency, and seven percent (7%) were unknown.  The breakdown (see 
graphs for 2 surveys) of the two surveys showed an eighteen percent (19%) increase 
from 2003 to 2006, but when the surveys were combined it only showed and overall 
increase of four percent (4%) for the three-year difference in surveys.  The two most 
observable changes between the two surveys was that thirty-nine percent (39%) more 
of the responding officers were familiar with their policies and plans, and thirty-one 
percent (31%)more agencies had written implemented policies and plans. The data also 
showed a five percent increase (5%) increase in the practicing of their action plans.  Of 
the forty-three (43) survey departments, sixteen (16) stated that they practiced the plans 
with other agencies, of the sixteen only stated two that the practiced their plans 
regularly.  Forty-nine percent (49%) of the responding agencies stated that they had 
some type of protective gear.  During interviews conducted after the surveys, further 
data was revealed that only about half of the agencies had readily available access to 
their gear, the majority advising that the gear was stored with their respective fire 
departments.  Also notable was an eleven percent (-11%) decrease in the responding 
agencies belief that a chemical or biological attack was a potential threat to their areas.  
See graphs (below) for 2003 (Figure1) and 2006 (Figure 2) for the question breakdown. 
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The data received from the two separate surveys from all responses combined 
showed a 15.8% increase in overall preparedness.  This increase over a three-year 
period indicates a 5.27% improvement in preparedness per agency yearly.  Figure three 
below shows the combined surveys and Figure four shows the percentages of officers 
trained from the total manpower perspective from the 43 responding agencies. 
(Figure 3)                                                                     (Figure 4) 
 
                                                                               
        
 
 
Figure five (below) shows the training breakdown of all responding agencies from 
2003 2006, and a combination of both.  The graph includes fully trained agencies, some 
or partially trained agencies, agencies with no officer trained and unknown training. 
 



















       
        
 











          (Figure 5) 
The above percentages and figures show that some progress has been made towards 
becoming more prepared, but also shows that as a whole, the majority of municipalities 










respond to a chemical or biological attack.  The above results, affirm the hypothesis, 
that after five years since 9/11 and billions of dollars spent, we are not still prepared.   
CONCLUSIONS 
 
As the 21st century is approached, the actions and preparation taken must reflect 
on our past to preserve the future for our children and then theirs.  The future is still 
based on small municipalities and communities and the values that they strive to 
maintain and project, as a model “American” city.  It is these values that speak out to 
create the picture that we are safe, because our community is ready to protect its 
citizens.  This (for the most part) is true for the daily pitfalls that all of us at some time 
will succumb to.  The date of 09/11/01 is a permanent scar on our hearts and pride as a 
world power, further more on our economy.  It only cost the terrorists maybe a million or 
two to plan, train and execute this horrendous event, but it cost the American people 
billions!  We do not want another day similar to this in the form of an epidemic from 
some biologically manufactured disease or a chemical release in some small 
community that has become a tourist venue for millions of people.  Though It is 
inevitable that all small communities will never fully be prepared, due to man power 
issues, funding, and proper sophisticated equipment, it is the duty of Agency Heads and 
City Governments to realize and put forth efforts to plan and prepare for an event of 
such great magnitude.  City governments must make a daunting effort to train the first 
responders, develop intergovernmental relations with local agencies within the 
respective counties, in order to develop and draft formal assistance agreements that 
would eliminate a heavy impact on the affected city.  Practice must take place on a 
consistent schedule to address local concerns and the issues of intra-agency 
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communications.  Training will impact departmental budgets, manning, and resources of 
all size agencies, but it is a required remedy to prevent and solve portions of the 
problem.  To circumvent some of these major costs, the Department of Homeland 
Security has projected a spending amount in excess of 800 million dollars to be used for 
homeland defense.  DHS and the Center for Disaster Preparedness have made 
available, free training and grant programs to obtain equipment, personnel and 
assessment needs.  This option should be taken advantage of.  It only takes a small 
amount of time and a little effort on the part of not just the Agency heads, but rather a 
joint effort amongst the entire city administration.  To fulfill our professional obligations 
to the communities that depend and trust in our abilities to protect them, we must be 
prepared.  It is time to change how we approach and operate to meet this challenge, by 
putting forth this effort.  
In conclusion the research shows with numbers and percentages that 
municipalities as a whole are not prepared to adequately respond to a bio-terrorism 
incident.  The lack of resources to properly plan and operate effectively, without the 
proper equipment, and the lack of intra-agency cooperation will continue to impact a 
potential coordinated effort to be prepared.  A positive note that was not considered in 
the research on the subject of preparedness of the municipalities was the individual law 
enforcement officer that makes up the largest portion of a municipality.  The resiliency 
and innovative thinking that each individually trained officer brings to the table, is 
paramount to public safety as a whole.  Although these characteristics do not take the 
place of proper equipment, additional resources and planning, it would allow for a more 
educated and evaluated approach to a chemical or biological attack.  
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 The author is a father, husband, leader, police officer, soldier, and supervisor, 
and with each new title the author’s priorities are idealistically and morally forced to 
change.  The colossal events of the very recent past and those unforeseen events to 
come in the future have added a new title to the municipal priority list!    
“Destiny is no matter of Chance, it is a matter of Choice.  It is not a thing to be 
waited for it is a thing to be Achieved!” 
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